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Abstract 
 
We use the work-leisure choice model to estimate equilibrium labour supply (hours-
worked) in New Zealand over the period 2000 – 2008.  We then stochastically solve 
the model over a future period from 2010 to 2050, and evaluate the New Zealand’s 
new tax policy. We compare the welfare and relative productivity (i.e., relative to 
Australia) outcomes for several tax policy scenarios. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The newly-elected New Zealand government changed the tax policy recently, and 
advocated a “growth-enhancing tax system”.  The new tax policy change includes an 
across the board reduction in the income tax rate, and an increase in the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) from 12.5 to 15 percent.   
 
Income (New Zealand 
Dollar) 
Old tax rates (%) New tax rates (%) 
0 to 14000 12.5 10.0 
14001 to 48000 21.0 17.5 
48001 70000 33.0 30.0 
Over 70000 38.0 33.0 
 
The objective of this paper is to measure the effect of the reduction in the average 
marginal income tax rate combined with an increase in GST from 12.5 to 15 percent 
on average relative labour productivity (i.e., relative to Australia) and welfare of the 
average household.   
 
We analyze macroeconomic aggregate data.i   We use the work-leisure choice model, 
where the effective marginal tax rate, affects household's labour supply directly, 
which in turn affects the level of GDP per person via the production function.  Then 
we stochastically simulate the model out-of-sample, and examine the welfare and 
productivity implications of the tax policy.   
 
We compare welfare and relative productivity changes that result from the tax policies 
with the baseline solution of the model.  Examination of "integrity" and "fairness" is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Public finance issues are also beyond this paper.   
 
We calibrate the model for both New Zealand and Australia because economic growth 
is a relative issue.  The model predicts that the labour supply curves for both New 
Zealand and Australia are reasonably elastic. The model's predicting factors (the share 
of capital in output and the consumption-output ratio) are quite close in the two 
countries, but the most significant difference is the effective marginal tax rate, which 
is significantly higher in New Zealand. We also find that the relative value of leisure  
is significantly lower in New Zealand.      
 
The model predicts that (1) an across the board 3 percent reduction in the income tax 
rate along with an increase in GST from 12.5 to 15 percent has no significant impact 
on either productivity or welfare.  (2) An increase in GST from 12.5 to 15 percent 
(without any other changes in taxes) reduces welfare by more than 5 percent and 
reduces relative productivity, i.e., productivity relative to Australia, from the baseline 
solution.  (3) Significant increase in both welfare and productivity could be achieved 
by reducing the income tax rate by 5 percent across the board without any increase in 
other tax rates.  (4) The productivity gap between New Zealand and Australia cannot 
be closed by only lowering the effective marginal rate in New Zealand to be equal to 
that of Australia because the productivity gap is a function of other variables.  Closing 
the productivity gap requires more changes. 
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The model is presented next.  In section 3 we estimate the labour supply for New 
Zealand and Australia.  Section 4 describes the several tax policies, the experimental 
design, the stochastic simulations and discuss the policy outcomes and evaluation.  
Section 5 is a conclusion. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We begin with the work-leisure choice model found in Nickell (2003), Prescott 
(2004) and Shimer (2009) to derive the labour supply.ii   
 
The utility function of a stand-in household who faces a work-leisure decision is give 
by:  )1()]100log([log
0 ⎭⎬
⎫
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⎧ −+= ∑∞
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The utility function depends on the expected discounted sum of consumption c and 
leisure, where 100 is the number of hours available for individuals to work in a week 
and is hours worked in “market activities”. The expectations operator h E does not 
necessarily mean rational expectations, and 10 << β is the discount factor and 
specifies the degree of patience.  A high value means more patience for consumption 
and leisure.  The parameter α is and denotes the value of the non-market 
productive time per household.  Maybe it is the relative value of the time spent in 
working at home.  Typically, it is the relative value of leisure. The production using 
this time is untaxed.  The utility function includes one consumption good, as in 
Christaino and Eichenbaum (1992).   
0>
 
The stock of capital evolves according to: 
 
)2()1(1 ttt xkk +−=+ δ  
 
Where is the stock of capital and is gross investments.  The depreciation rate is k tx δ . 
 
There is a stand-in firm with a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale technology of 
production: 
 
)3(1 ttttttit gxchkAy ++≥= −θθ   
 
where is government expenditures. g
 
Total factor productivity is exogenous and is given by . The parameter tA 10 <<θ is 
the share of capital.   
 
It is argued that the technical progress is exogenous because it plays no role in the 
inference being drawn.  
 
The household’s date  budget constraint is: t
 
)4())(1(.)1()1()1( ttttKtthtxtc Tkkrhwxc ++−−+−=+++ δδττττ  
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Where w is the real wage, r is the real interest rate or rental capital and T is transfer 
payment. The tax rates of consumption, investments, labour and capital are given 
byτ with the subscripts , c x , , denote consumption, investments and capital 
respectively.
h k
iii  
 
The aggregate effective marginal tax rate on labour income is derived from the tax 
rate on consumption cτ and on labour hτ .  It is the fraction of additional labour 
income that is taken in the form of taxes, holding investments fixed.   
 
)5(
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τ
τττ +
+=  
 
It is important to note that the National Income Account is adjusted to fit with 
economics theory, where households pay the taxes.  The major adjustment is to treat 
"indirect taxes less subsidy" as "net taxes on final product". It means "net indirect tax" 
is not a cost component of GDP.  Indirect taxes include value-added taxes, sales taxes, 
excise taxes, property taxes…etc, which mostly levied on households.   Some indirect 
taxes such as diesel fuel taxes, property taxes on office buildings and sales taxes on 
equipments…etc fall on all forms of products.  It is assumed that 2/3 of the indirect 
taxes less subsidy fall directly on private consumption expenditures and the remaining 
1/3 is distributed evenly over private consumption and private investment.   
 
The net indirect taxes on consumption, is: 
 
)6(]3/13/2[ IT
IC
CITc ++= ,  
 
whereC is private consumption expenditures, I is private investment, and IT is net 
indirect taxes.   The model economy's consumption is cmil ITGGCc −−+= , where 
is public consumption and is military spending.  The model economy's output 
is given by . 
G milG
ITGDPy −=
 
The consumption tax rate is: 
 
 )7(
c
c
c ITC
IT
−=τ .   
 
There are two taxes on labour income: the income tax with a marginal tax 
rate incτ (which we argued earlier in the paper that its estimation is highly 
controversial) and a social security tax.  The social security marginal tax rate 
))(1(
sec
ITGDP
taxesuritysocial
ss −−= θτ  , where the denominator is labour income if labour is paid 
its marginal productivity.  This is zero both in New Zealand and Australia. 
 
The average income tax rate is 
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where direct taxes are paid by households and do not include corporate income taxes. 
Prescott's estimate of the marginal labour income tax incssh t ττ 6.1+= , where the 
magic number 1.6 reflects the fact that the marginal income tax rates are higher than 
the average tax rates.  The number delivers a marginal income tax found in Feenberg 
and Coutts (1993) for the "US". Their calculation of the marginal income tax is based 
on a representative sample of tax records.  They calculate by how much the tax 
revenue increases if every household labour income is increased by one percent.  The 
total change in tax receipts divided by the total change in labour income is their 
estimate of the marginal income tax.   
 
We conducted a sensitivity analysis to examine the effect of the scalar 1.6 on hτ .  At 
numbers larger than 1.6, the labour supply estimates become unreasonably small 
because the effective marginal tax rate becomes unreasonably large.   
 
From the utility function we get the first order condition the marginal rate of 
substitution equals to the price ratios: 
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And from the production function we get, the marginal product of labour is equal to 
the real wage rate: 
 
)10(/)1()1( ttttt hyhkw θθ θθ −=−= −  
 
The equilibrium labour supply is solved for from the two FOC above,  
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The intertemporal substitution is captured by the ratio of consumption to GDP, .  
The intratemporal substation is captured by the tax rate
yc /
τ .  If the effective tax rate on 
labour income is expected to be lower in the future, for example, people will increase 
their current consumption.iv   
 
3. Estimating the labour supply 
 
We use data from 2000 to 2008 to estimate the labour supply for New Zealand and 
Australia.  Details of the data are found in the appendix. Table 1 reports our estimates 
of the predicting factors of the labour supply: cτ ; incτ ; hτ , which combined, give us an 
estimate of the aggregate effective marginal tax rateτ ;  ; yc / θ ; α ; and the supply 
of labour . We also report the Frisch elasticity and output per person of working age 
for both Australia and New Zealand.  New Zealand has a relatively high effective 
h
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marginal tax rate, 44 percent compared with 35 percent for Australia.  New Zealand's 
consumption tax rate, income tax rate and the marginal labour income tax are all 
higher than Australia. The Internal Revenue Department Briefing of the Incoming 
Minister document (2010), which is posted on their website, acknowledges that New 
Zealander's are subject to a relatively high effective marginal tax rate.  New Zealand's 
effective marginal tax rate is still higher than those of the G7.v   
 
The relative value of leisure, α (relative to the price of consumption goods) which 
solves the equilibrium labour supply equation above is smaller in New Zealand than 
that of Australia, 1.3 compared with 1.9 in Australia.  On average, New Zealanders 
work slightly longer hours than Australians.vi   
 
The supply curves are elastic as indicated by the Frisch elasticity, which is consistent 
with international evidence.vii  The level of GDP per person of working age is 0.70 of 
Australia, see Prescott (2002) and Razzak (2007) among others.      
 
4. Six tax policy scenarios 
 
We solve the model numerically over the period 2008 to 2050 using stochastic 
simulation with 10000 iterations.viii  To simplify the solution of the model, we appeal to 
the stochastic implications of the lifecycle – permanent income theory of consumption, 
and assume that the conditional expectations of the future marginal utility of 
consumption follow a random walk (Hall, 1978).  The model is solved using the 
historical parameters reported in table 1 to generate the baseline solution.  
 
Then we solved the model six times under the different policy scenarios above.  We 
examine six scenarios.  For each tax policy scenario we measure the welfare and the 
relative productivity changes.  Scenario I is where we examine the New Zealand’s 
government tax policy of an across the board decrease in the income tax rate combined 
with an increase in GST from 12.5 to 15 percent.  The other five scenarios are 
hypothetical. They are arbitrarily chosen. We compare these policy scenarios to the 
baseline model’s outcomes.   
 
Scenario II considers an across the board decrease in the marginal income tax by 3 
percent without any change in other tax rates.  Scenario III examines a policy where 
GST increases from 12.5 percent to 15 percent while all other indirect taxes are kept 
the same.  In these scenarios we intend to show that hiking up the GST rate adversely 
affects welfare.  Scenario IV shows the effect of a policy where the marginal income 
tax rate is cut by 5 percent across the board.  Scenario V examines the effect of a tax 
policy where the marginal income tax rate of the top income earners only is decreased 
from 39 to 30 percent, and finally scenario VI, where we decrease New Zealand’s 
effective marginal tax rate from 44 percent to be equal to Australia’s rate of 35 
percent. 
 
These policy scenarios require recalculating the direct and indirect tax rates in the 
simulations.  The new tax policy, where the income tax rate is reduced for every 
income bracket changes incτ  in equation (8) via changes in: 
 
 )12()(* 44332211 zazazazayTaxDirect t +++= , 
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where is real GDP, are the statutory tax rates corresponding to the 
proportions of taxpayers, .    The total number of taxpayers in March 2008 was 
3423421. An across the board reduction of the income tax is a reduction of 3 percent 
on average (The simple average falls from 26 to 23 percent and the weighted average 
falls from 20 to 17 percent). 
y 41, aa L
41 zz L
 
Income Brackets Weights (% of taxpayers) 
z  
%Average tax 
rate (a) 
%New tax rate 
(new a) 
0-14000 1z 0.39 12.5 10 
14001-48000 2z 0.46 21 17.5 
48001-70000 3z 0.10 33 30 
> 70000 4z 0.06 39 33 
Average  26 23 
Weighted Average  20 17 
incτ   0.20 0.16 
 
The increase in GST from 12.5 to 15 percent affects the supply labour through the 
following: 
 
)13(GSTnonGSTIT −+=  
 
(i.e., are taxes on specific goods and excise taxes) GSTnon −
 
and 
 
)14()(125.0* GSTnonyIT t −+=   
 
Then we use equation (14) to solve for indirect taxes on consumption in equation 
(6) and consumption tax rate
cIT
cτ in equation (7) which affects the effective marginal tax 
rateτ in equation (5) and the supply of labour (weekly hours-worked) in equation 
(11). 
h
 
Note that in equation (12) also changes when the top income tax rate is reduced 
from 39 percent to 30 percent.  We use the distribution of taxpayers by income band 
in the table above to calculate the changes in
4a
incτ and hτ (equation 8).  
 
Reducing the average tax rate by 5 percent across the board reduces the a 's in 
equation (12) to 7.5, 16, 28 and 34 percent for respectively.  Note that all 
the income tax scenarios alter 
421 ,, aaa L
incτ , cτ and eventually τ , the labour supply and output. 
 
The tax scenarios were evaluated by computing the change in relative productivity to 
Australia over the average period 2012-2050. For welfare, we compute the average 
Lifetime Consumption Equivalent, which is the change in real consumption required 
to make the households indifferent to the policy; the standard Hicks compensation 
principle.ix   
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The quantitative results reported in table 2 are intuitive and are as predicted by the 
model.  The current new policy of reducing the income tax rate across the board by 3 
percent and increasing GST from 12.5 to 15 percent has no significant effect on either 
welfare or relative productivity.  This finding contradicts the government’s objective of 
adopting a growth-enhancing tax policy.  It is quite clear that the policy of reducing the 
income tax rate across the board without any increase in GST has superior outcomes. It 
increases both welfare and relative productivity significantly.  The government’s desire 
perhaps was to keep revenues intact, i.e., keep the government budget constraint 
unchanged.  By doing so, the growth objective and the welfare implications could not 
be achieved. 
 
A reduction of the income tax rate across the board brings about the best outcome.  It 
turned out that a 5 percent reduction in the income tax rate for every taxpayer would 
eventually increase the labour supply significantly, by two hours a week per person; 
increase relative productivity from 72.3 percent to more than 76.5 percent; and increase 
welfare as measured by the Lifetime Consumption Equivalent per person by a 
significant 11.6 percent. 
 
An increase in GST to 15 percent affects the average household.  It increases the 
effective marginal tax rate τ (see equation 5) and reduces the supply of labour by one 
hour a week per person (see equation 11). This reduction amounts to a reduction in 
output and output per person of working age relative to Australia (via the production 
function).  It reduces New Zealand's productivity by a small amount from about 72.3 to 
70.6 of Australia's level.  Most importantly is that the increase in GST reduces welfare 
measured by the Lifetime Consumption Equivalent; we estimate that change from 
baseline to be -4 percent on average over the period 2010 to 2015. 
 
A reduction in the top income tax rate to 30 percent would increase labour supply 
slightly and improve relative productivity to Australia by a very small amount; labour 
supply increases from 72.3 percent to 72.7 percent of Australia's level.  Welfare 
increases by a small amount.  The high income bracket represents only 6 percent of the 
total number of taxpayers. 
 
Finally we reduced the effective marginal tax rate in New Zealand from 44 percent to 
Australia's level of 35 percent.  Welfare increases by 17 percent in terms of Lifetime 
Consumption Equivalent.  Relative productivity is 78.2 of Australia's level, which is an 
increase by more than 6 percentage points from baseline.  This is a very significant 
increase; however, it demonstrates that the productivity gap between New Zealand and 
Australia could not be closed by making the effective marginal tax rate equal to that of 
Australia.  
 
There are two important additional differences between New Zealand and Australia in 
the model, which affect the level of productivity.  First, Australia's stock of capital is 
several times larger than New Zealand's, see Razzak (2007) and Hall and Scobie (2005) 
for example. The stock of capital is key in the Solow (1957) growth model and many 
endogenous growth models.  Second, population is different, so GDP per capita is 
different.  Population has a scale effect, whereby it affects the probability of producing 
"new ideas" a la Jones (e.g., Jones, 2002) that drives the growth rate of technical 
progress. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
We used the work-leisure model to estimate the labour supply for New Zealand and 
Australia over the period 2000 to 2008 as a function of the effective marginal tax rate, 
consumption- output ratio, and the share of capital in production. We calculated New 
Zealand's productivity level relative to Australia.  We found that New Zealand's 
effective marginal tax rate is significantly higher than Australia's, 44 percent 
compared with 35 percent.  Average weekly hours-worked per person in New Zealand 
is just slightly higher than that of Australia; the Frisch elasticity suggests that both 
schedules are elastic; but the relative value of leisure, which solves the model is much 
higher in Australia than in New Zealand.  The productivity gap is wide.  New 
Zealand's level is 70 percent of Australia's as shown earlier in Prescott (2002) and 
Razzak (2007) among others.  
 
We then solved the model stochastically 10000 times over the period 2010 to 2050 to 
obtain a baseline solution, i.e., without any policy, for the labour supply and the 
productivity level relative to Australia's. Then, we evaluated a number of policy 
scenarios by, first, comparing the change in the relative productivity level that results 
from each policy with the baseline solution, and second, by computing the change in 
welfare of New Zealanders induced by the policy. Welfare was measured by the 
standard Lifetime Consumption Equivalent, which is the change in real consumption 
required to be given to or taken away from households to keep them indifferent to the 
policy.  
 
We examined the new tax policy of the reduction of the income tax rate by 3 percent 
across the board along with an increase in GST from 12.5 percent to 15 percent.  The 
welfare and productivity outcomes of this policy are insignificant.  It produces no 
significant change in either outcome, and seems contradictory to the government’s 
claim that the policy is growth-enhancing. 
 
We also examined a number of tax scenarios for comparison.  An increase in GST 
from 12.5 percent to 15 percent reduces both welfare and productivity. Importantly, 
the reduction in welfare is quite significant, more than 4 percent.  The effective of an 
increase in GST on welfare and productivity dominates the effect of a decrease in 
income tax rate effect. 
 
A reduction in the income tax rate of 3 percent across the board without any other 
changes is a superior policy.  It increases welfare to 6.65 percent and relative 
productivity from 0.72 to 0.75 relative to baseline.  In fact, the best outcomes are 
associated with a policy that reduces the income tax rate across the board by 5 percent 
without any change in GST or other tax rates.  This increases welfare to 11.6 percent 
and productivity relative to Australia rises from 0.723 to 0.765.  A tax policy to 
reduce the income tax rate of the top earners from 39 to 30 percent produces a welfare 
outcome slightly better than those of the new tax policy. A small increase in welfare 
of 1.14 percent is still preferred to an increase of 0.6 percent associated with the new 
tax policy.  
 
Finally, we demonstrated that even if New Zealand dropped its effective marginal tax 
rate to the level of Australia, i.e., from 44 to 35 percent, the productivity gap between 
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the two countries would not be eliminated because the level of productivity depends 
on other variables in addition to the effective marginal tax rate.  New Zealand lacks 
adequate levels of physical capital, see Hall and Scobie (2005) and Razzak (2007).  
The stock of capital is a driving variable in the Solwo (1957) exogenous growth 
theory, and the population of New Zealand is relatively small. Population drives 
productivity growth up in Jones’s (2002) endogenous growth model. The scale effect 
works through the generation of "new ideas," which are proportional to population.  
That said, the increase and welfare and productivity are substantial. 
 
While changing the "household" tax policy is necessary to ignite economic growth in 
New Zealand, capital taxation policies are equally important.  Policies which provide 
incentives for savings and the capital accumulation are imperative.  An R&D capital 
strategy, where commercialization is at its heart is also necessary (Johnson et al., 
2007).  And finally a growth-oriented immigration policy, which is independent of the 
government and based on satisfying the country's needs on economic basis, is vital.    
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Table 1: Average Labour supply over the period (Average 2000-2008) 
 New Zealand Australia New Zealand relative to Australia 
θ  0.45 0.41 1.09 
hτ  0.32 0.25 1.28 
cτ  0.23 0.16 1.43 
τ  0.44 0.35 1.25 
yc /  0.71 0.69 1.02 
α  1.30 1.90 0.68 
h  26.96 25.12 1.07 
Frisch elasticity  2.70 2.98 0.91 
Output per person 29749.05 42256.41 0.70 
• θ  share of capital in production measured by gross operating surplus / GDP 
• hτ the marginal labour tax rate 
• cτ the consumption tax rate 
• 
C
Ch
τ
τττ +
+=
1
 
• the consumption / output ratio. The data are for 2000 – 2007 yc /
• α the relative value of leisure 
• )]1/(/)1/[()1( hych ταθθ −+−−= , equilibrium hours - worked 
• Frisch elasticity of the labour supply 
• Output per working age population (15-64) 
• Data are in PPP (US dollars) 2005  
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Table 2: Tax Policy Simulations (average 2010-2015)  
 Baseline Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV  Policy V Policy VI 
θ  0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 
hτ  0.32 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.24 0.31 - 
cτ  0.23 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.23 - 
incτ  0.20 0.17 0.168 0.20 0.15 0.19 - 
τ  0.443 0.489 0.404 0.467 0.380 0.438 0.35 
yc /  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71 
α  1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
h  24.87 25.04 26.26 24.07 26.98 25.11 27.87 
Frisch elasticity  3.02 2.99 2.80 3.15 2.70 2.98 2.58 
GDP per person Relative to Australia 0.723 0.728 0.751 0.706 0.765 0.727 0.782 
5Lifetime Consumption Equivalent %  0.0066 0.0665 -0.0407 0.1157 0.0114 0.1697 
• θ  share of capital in production measured by gross operating surplus / GDP 
• hτ the marginal labour tax rate 
• cτ the consumption tax rate 
• α the relative value of leisure fixed to 1.3 for NZ and 1.9 for Australia 
)]1/(/)1/[()1(• hych ταθθ −+−−= , equilibrium hours - worked 
• Frisch elasticity of the labour supply 
• Output per working age population (15-64) relative to Australia 
• Lifetime Consumption Equivalent is the measure of welfare. It is the amount of consumption that should either increase or decrease to make the household 
indifferent to policy 
• Policy I  : A decrease in marginal income tax rate by 3 percent across the board along with an increase in GST from 12.5 to 15 percent.  
• Policy II :  Decrease average (across the board) income tax rate by 3 percent 
• Policy III: Increase of GST from 12.5 to 15 %. Other Items in IT were Kept unchanged 
• Policy IV: A decrease in the marginal income tax rate by 5 percent across the board 
• Policy V : A decrease in the marginal income tax rate of the top income bracket from 39 to 30 percent 
• Policy VI: Decrease New Zealand's effective marginal tax rate from 44 percent to Australia's 35 percent 
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Data Appendix 
Average 2000-2008 Source Australia New Zealand
General government final consumption expenditure, 
%GDP 
OECD 17.90 18.03
Consumption of fixed capital, % GDP OECD 15.30 13.90
Household final consumption expenditure, % GDP OECD 57.34 58.74
Working Age Population to Total Population OECD 0.67 0.65
Employment to Age working population OECD 0.72 0.75
Taxes  individuals, % GDP OECD 11.98 14.69
Social Security Contributions, Employees % GDP OECD 0.00 0.00
Taxes on goods and services, % GDP IRD 8.77 11.84
Military Expenditure, % GDP World Bank 1.96 1.08
cτ   0.16 0.23
ssτ   0.00 0.00
Capital Share  0.41 0.45
incτ   0.14 0.20
hτ   0.22 0.32τ   0.35 0.44
yc /   0.69 0.71
yk /  
Statistics 
New 
Zealand 
and ABS 
2.325 2.86
GDP Per Person, GDP Less IT  in PPP (US dollars) 
2005  divided By Population aged 15-64 
 
42256.41 29749.05
• The distribution of income tax payers is from the IRD.  
• The net indirect taxes on consumption, is IT
IC
CITc ]3/13/2[ ++= , where is private  C
        consumption expenditures, I is private investment, and is net indirect taxes. IT
• )/( ccc ITCIT −=τ  
• Consumption is cmil ITGGCc −−+= , where is public consumption and is military 
spending.  The GDP is given by 
G milG
ITGDPy −= . 
• Tax on labour income are: the income tax with a marginal tax rate incτ (which we argued 
earlier in the paper that its estimation is highly controversial) and a social security tax.  The 
average income tax rate is 
onDepreciatiITGDP
TaxesDirect
inc −−=τ , where direct taxes are paid by 
households and do not include corporate income taxes. Prescott's estimate of the marginal 
labour income tax incssh t ττ 6.1+=  
• incτ the marginal income tax rate. 
• 
C
Ch
τ
τττ +
+=
1
 
• the consumption / output ratio, where consumption is as above and  is deflated by the 
respective PPP price deflators (PWT 6.2 ). 
yc / y
 
• ssτ is social security tax rate. 
• The capital-labour ratio  in 1972 for New Zealand, and from 1970 for Australia are 2.286 
and 2.35 respectively. We generate as .  The depreciation rate is fixed equal the 
ratio of consumption of fixed capital to capital, 0.08 and 0.09 for New Zealand and Australia 
respectively.  We use the perpetual inventory method to generate the stock of capital in PPP 
because the original data were not in PPP.  For the out-of-sample stochastic simulation we fix 
yk /
0k tyyk )./(
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the depreciation rate equal to the average over the sample from 2000-2008 and for investment, 
we also use the fixed average of investments to GDP ratio over the sample from 2000-2008, 
and iteratively solve for the investment level .  These ratios are 0.23 and 0.29 for 
New Zealand and Australia.  Output is given by the production function in the 
model.     
tyyx )./(
• Total hours enter the production function, equation (3), which is equal to weekly hours 
generated by the model times 52 weeks a year time employment.  We assume that population 
grows at their historical growth rate using a linear trend over the period 2000-2008 and the 
employment and working age population are assumed to be fixed fraction of the population, also 
taken from data over the period 2000-2008. Employment to population ratio is 0.49 for New 
Zealand and 0.48 for Australia. Working age population ratio is fixed to 0.65 for New Zealand 
and 0.67 for Australia. 
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i We do not have data for “working for family” tax program. Our analysis focuses on the average 
household, where data are available.  
 
ii Prescott cites a number of papers as the basis of this theory; business cycle literature Cooley (1995) 
and Cooley and Ohanian (1999); in the depression literature he cites Kehoe and Prescott (2002); in 
public finance, Christaino and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993); and in the stock market 
literature McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Boldrin, Christian and Fisher (2001).  The labour supply 
is consistent with Lucas and Rapping (1969), Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott (1982), Hansen 
(1985) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
 
iii There is a literature on the methods of estimating average marginal income tax rates in the US, where 
differences in time series seem significant.  Differences in the computation of income tax rates could 
affect the tax rateτ  in model. For more on the debate, see Barro (1979), Seater (1982), Barro and 
Sahasakul (1983, 1986), Stephenson (1998), and Akhand and Liu (2002).  We do not use time series 
and do not run regressions. Research which use such methodology should examine these issues.   
 
iv In this model, the government budget constraint remains unchanged, hence not present in this model.  
When the tax rate changes because of a certain policy, expenditures must altered to the keep the budget 
constraint unchanged. Or if one tax rate changes other rate must offset that change to keep the budget 
constraint unchanged.   
 
v Laabas and Razzak (2010) estimates of the G7 effective marginal tax rates over the same period are: 
38, 37, 42, 40, 25, 38 and 30 for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US 
respectively.  
 
vi Laabas and Razzak (2010) estimate the supply curves for the G7.  The estimates of the relative value 
of leisure are: 1.6, 2.2, 2.1, 1.7, 2.1, 1.6, and 1.6 for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and 
the US respectively.  
 
vii The microeconomics-level estimates are less than one. 
 
viii When solving, an approximated Jacobian is used when linearizing the model.  Then the 
approximation is updated each iteration by comparing the residuals, which result from the new trial 
value of the endogenous variables with the residuals of the linear equation.   The method is not 
significantly different from Newton, but it runs faster. The innovations to stochastic equations are 
generated by drawing a set of random numbers from a standard normal distribution each period.  These 
draws are scaled to match the variance-covariance system by multiplying the vector by its standard 
deviation because the covariance matrix is diagonal.   
 
ix The simulation’s time horizon from 2015 to 2050 does not change the results.  
 
